Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File), July 1940-September 1945, box 12, S-1, Tacitly dissenting from the Targeting Committees recommendations, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall argued for initial nuclear use against a clear-cut military target such as a large naval installation. If that did not work, manufacturing areas could be targeted, but only after warning their inhabitants. 76 (copy from microfilm), Physicists Leo Szilard and James Franck, a Nobel Prize winner, were on the staff of the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago, a cover for the Manhattan Project program to produce fuel for the bomb. 1-127. . The warning would draw on the draft State-War proclamation to Japan; presumably, the one criticized by Hull (above) which included language about the emperor. Truman Plays Part of Himself in Skit at Gridiron Dinner, and List of Members and Guests at the Gridiron Show,The Washington Post, 16 December 1945. While U.S. leaders hailed the bombings at the time and for many years afterwards for bringing the Pacific war to an end and saving untold thousands of American lives, that interpretation has since been seriously challenged. [58]. Were there alternatives to the use of the weapons? The total area devastated by the atomic strike on Hiroshima is shown in the darkened area (within the circle) of the photo. For more on these developments, see Asada, "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration," 486-488. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-BT), The mushroom cloud billowing up 20,000 feet over Hiroshima on the morning of August 6, 1945 (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-AEC), The Enola Gay returns to Tinian Island after the strike on Hiroshima. Three-quarters of a century on, Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain emblematic of the dangers and human costs of warfare, specifically the use of nuclear weapons. The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and I weighed that decision most prayerfully. Frightened by the rapid movement of Soviet forces into Manchuria and worried that the army might launch a coup, the peace party set in motion a plan to persuade Hirohito to meet with the cabinet and the Big Six to resolve the stalemate over the response to the Allies. Stimsons diary mentions meetings with Eisenhower twice in the weeks before Hiroshima, but without any mention of a dissenting Eisenhower statement (and Stimsons diaries are quite detailed on atomic matters). [3] The NASM exhibit was drastically scaled-down but historians and journalist continued to engage in the debate. Historians have suggested a number of ways in which the atomic bomb might have alienated Stalin- 1. At the outset, three possibilities were envisioned: radiological warfare, a power source for submarines and ships, and explosives. And on Aug. 6, a bomb would fall on Hiroshima, ultimately killing an. See also Alex Wellersteins The Kyoto Misconception. Fax: 202/994-7005Contact by email. By the summer, once production plants would be at work, he proposed that the War Department take over the project. If you experience a barrier that affects your ability to access content on this page, let us know via ourContact form. Zenshiro Hoshina, a senior naval official, attended the conference and prepared a detailed account. The 70th anniversary of the event presents an opportunity to set the record straight on five widely held myths about the bomb. For useful discussion of this meeting and the other Target Committee meetings, see Norris, 382-386. Early in the morning of August 9th Manchuria was invaded by the Soviet Union. [59a]. Later, he met with Secretary of State Byrnes and they discussed the Manhattan Projects secrecy and the huge expenditures. President Franklin Roosevelt called the attack a day which will live in infamy, and the American people were shocked and angered. Since the end of WWII, the popular view in the U.S. has been that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki precipitated Japan's surrender on August 15. Relations between the United States and Japan worsened when Japanese forces took aim at Indochina with the goal of capturing oil rich areas of the East Indies. To a great extent the documents selected for this compilation have been declassified for years, even decades; the most recent declassifications were in the 1990s. Confronting the Problem of Radiation Poisoning, XII. On August 9th, 1945, Truman declared that the use of the A-bomb had saved THOUSANDS of American lives. 5, This review of Japanese capabilities and intentions portrays an economy and society under tremendous strain; nevertheless, the ground component of the Japanese armed forces remains Japans greatest military asset. Alperovitz sees statements in this estimate about the impact of Soviet entry into the war and the possibility of a conditional surrender involving survival of the emperor as an institution as more evidence that the policymakers saw alternatives to nuclear weapons use. Source: U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD, Record Group 373, Defense Intelligence Agency, Aerial Film, U.S., Army Air Force. It had nothing to do with Russia or Britain or Germany. During a conversation with Joseph E. Davies, a prominent Washington lawyer and former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Truman said that he wanted to delay talks with Stalin and Churchill until July when the first atomic device had been tested. Bernstein, however, notes that Bard later denied that he had a meeting with Truman and that White House appointment logs support that claim. A collectionoftranscribed documents is Gene Dannens Atomic Bomb: Decision. For a print collection of documents, see Dennis Merrill ed.,Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Volume I: The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb on Japan(University Publications of America, 1995). It is quite apparent that the United States did, in fact, drop the two atomic bombs, Little Boy and Fat Man on Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively for the . Private collections were also important, such as the Henry L. Stimson Papers held at Yale University (although available on microfilm, for example, at the Library of Congress) and the papers of W. Averell Harriman at the Library of Congress. [6], In its discussion of the effects of an atomic weapon, the committee considered both blast and radiological damage. These cables are the earliest reports of the mission; the bombing of Nagasaki killed immediately at least 39,000 people, with more dying later. objectives. Judgment at the Smithsonian(New York: Matthews and Company, 1995), pp. The 509th Composite Groups cover story for its secret mission was the preparation of Pumpkins for use in battle. Frank, 273-274; Bernstein, The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. The Soviet source reported that the weight of the device was 3 tons (which was in the ball park) and forecast an explosive yield of 5 kilotons. With the goal of having enough fissile material by the first half of 1945 to produce the bombs, Bush was worried that the Germans might get there first. For example, one of McCloys aides, Colonel Fahey, argued against modification of unconditional surrender (see Appendix C`). 25,000 more were injured. Frank, 258; Bernstein (1995), 147; Walker (2005), 322. Experts: How Powerful, Widespread Is Fallout From a Nuclear Bomb? Here senior State Department officials, Under Secretary Joseph Grew on one side, and Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish on the other, engaged in hot debate. For Davies at Potsdam, see Elizabeth Kimball MacLean,Joseph E. Davies: Envoy to the Soviets(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 151-166. Note: The second page of the diary entry includes a newspaper clipping of the Associated Presss transmission of the Byrnes note. [59]. The question is: The Untied States decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a diplomatic measure calculated to intimidate the Soviet Union in the post-Second-World-War era rather then a strictly military measure designed to force Japan's unconditional suuender. The dropping of two atomic bombs, the tremendous destruction caused by U.S. bombing, and the Soviet declaration of war notwithstanding, important elements of the Japanese Army were unwilling to yield, as was evident from intercepted messages dated 12 and 13 August. According to Herbert Bix, for months Hirohito had believed that the outlook for a negotiated peace could be improved if Japan fought and won one last decisive battle, thus, he delayed surrender, continuing to procrastinate until the bomb was dropped and the Soviets attacked.[52]. Whether Eisenhower expressed such reservations prior to Hiroshima will remain a matter of controversy. Henry L. Stimson Papers (MS 465), Sterling Library, Yale University (reel 113) (microfilm at Library of Congress), Still interested in trying to find ways to warn Japan into surrender, this represents an attempt by Stimson before the Potsdam conference, to persuade Truman and Byrnes to agree to issue warnings to Japan prior to the use of the bomb. In accordance with the dinners rules that reporters are never present, Trumans remarks were off-the record. [17], Scientists and officers held further discussion of bombing mission requirements, including height of detonation, weather, radiation effects (Oppenheimers memo), plans for possible mission abort, and the various aspects of target selection, including priority cities (a large urban area of more than three miles diameter) and psychological dimension. [54]. Thanks to Alex Wellerstein for the suggestion and the archival link. As part of the war with Japan, the Army Air Force waged a campaign to destroy major industrial centers with incendiary bombs. The alternative is prompt and utter destruction. The next day, in response to questions from journalists about the governments reaction to the ultimatum, Prime Minister Suzuki apparently said that We can only ignore [mokusatsu] it. Claypool, 1984) With such motivation to back them, the United States felt justified in dropping the atomic bomb in order to prevent the spread of communism in Europe by intimidating Russia. While Lincoln believed that the proposed peace teams were militarily acceptable he doubted that they were workable or that they could check Soviet expansion which he saw as an inescapable result of World War II. editors,Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), xxx-xxv; Sherwin, 210-215. [80], Despite Trumans claim that he made the most terrible decision at Potsdam, he assigned himself more responsibility than the historical record supports. [13]. Tsar Bomba, (Russian: "King of Bombs") , byname of RDS-220, also called Big Ivan, Soviet thermonuclear bomb that was detonated in a test over Novaya Zemlya island in the Arctic Ocean on October 30, 1961. [62]. As this August marks the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we are once again urged to reflect on the political role of the weapon that inaugurated the Nuclear Age. [54], This summary included several intercepted messages from Sato, who conveyed his despair and exasperation over what he saw as Tokyos inability to develop terms for ending the war: [I]f the Government and the Military dilly-dally in bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes. Sato remained skeptical that the Soviets would have any interest in discussions with Tokyo: it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Three Power Proclamation and then engage in conversations with our special envoy., Documents 60A-D: These messages convey the process of creating and transmitting the execution order to bomb Hiroshima. Harriman opined that surrender is in the bag because of the Potsdam Declarations provision that the Japanese could choose their own form of government, which would probably include the Emperor. Further, the only alternative to the Emperor is Communism, implying that an official role for the Emperor was necessary to preserve social stability and prevent social revolution. The first paragraph mocks the Japanese press for exaggerating the aftereffects of the explosion, for giving in to popular rumor that takes press reports to absurdity. The Soviet report suggests that the exaggeration of the Japanese press stemmed from Japans attempt to save face in light of the defeat. The United States used the bomb to end the war with Japan, which began in 1941 when Japan launched an unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor. Bush-Conant papers, S-1 Historical File, Reports to and Conferences with the President (1942-1944), National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter RG 77), Manhattan Engineering District (MED), Minutes of the Military Policy Meeting (5 May 1943), Correspondence (Top Secret) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, microfilm publication M1109 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1980), Roll 3, Target 6, Folder 23, Military Policy Committee, Minutes of Meetings, Before the Manhattan Project had produced any weapons, senior U.S. government officials had Japanese targets in mind.